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MEMORYRANGER PREVENTS HIJACKING 
FILE OBJECT STRUCTURES IN WINDOWS 
KERNEL 
Igor Korkin, PhD 
Security Researcher 
Moscow, Russia 
igor.korkin@gmail.com 
ABSTRACT 
Windows OS kernel memory is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. By launching such 
attacks, hackers are succeeding in process privilege escalation and tampering with users ' data by 
accessing kernel-mode memory. This paper considers a new example of such an attack, which 
results in access to the files opened in an exclusive mode. Windows built-in security features 
prevent such legal access, but attackers can circumvent them by patching dynamically allocated 
objects. The research shows that the Windows 10, version 1809 x64 is vulnerable to this attack. 
The paper provides an example of using MemoryRanger, a hypervisor-based solution to prevent 
such attack by running kernel-mode drivers in isolated kernel memory enclaves. 
Keywords: attacks on files, hypervisor-based protection, memory isolation, exclusively opened 
file. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern preemptive multitasking operating 
systems like Windows and UNIX-based systems 
have two modes of operation: user mode and 
kernel mode. These modes are supported by 
CPUs and make it possible to isolate code and 
memory data in these two modes. 
Apart from OS kernel and drivers, kernel-
mode memory includes a lot of sensitive data 
structures, which can be used by attackers. 
CPUs do not provide any security features to 
prevent illegal access to that memory. As a 
result, intruders can gain read- and write-
access to the kernel-mode memory by installing 
malware drivers or by exploiting driver 
vulnerabilities. 
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To mitigate these threats Windows has 
issued several protection mechanisms: 
PatchGuard, Device Guard etc. but they 
protect only fixed memory regions. For 
example, PatchGuard detects the Microsoft 
drivers hijacking (Unknowncheats, 2019). These 
security features do not completely prevent 
access to the dynamically allocated data 
structures. 
For example, by exploiting Microsoft CVE-
2018-8120 (Rapid7, 2018-a) vulnerability an 
attacker "could run arbitrary code in kernel 
mode". By using recently published 
vulnerabilities CVE-2018-8611 (Rapid7, 2018-b) 
and CVE-2018-8170 (Rapid7, 2018-c) attackers 
can elevate process privileges even on the 
newest Windows 10. 
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Newest APT such as FruityArmor and 
SandCat applies zero-day vulnerabilities of 
Windows OS kernel components, such as 
Win32k.sys to elevate process privileges: CVE-
2018-8453, CVE-2018-8589, CVE-2019-0797. 
During these attacks, intruders patch the fields 
of EPROCESS structure, which corresponds to 
the particular process. 
This paper considers a new kernel-mode 
memory attack on FILE_ OBJECT structures, 
which makes it possible to read and write the 
content of the files opened by drivers in an 
exclusive mode. As a result, attackers can 
illegally access opened local and network files, 
which were not permitted for sharing. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows. 
Section 2 provides the details of this attack 
and shows that security features from Windows 
10 do not prevent it. 
Section 3 contains the details of adapting 
MemoryRanger to prevent this attack and 
demonstrates that this solution successfully 
prevents this attack. 
Section 4 and Section 5 focus on the main 
conclusions and further research directions 
respectively. 
2.HLJACKING 
FILE OBJECT TO GET 
AN ACCESS TO THE 
FILE OPENED IN 
EXCLUSIVE MODE 
This section describes the internals of filesystem 
routines in the kernel mode with and without 
sharing access. The details of how to gain a full 
access to the file opened in an exclusive mode 
will be given in the second part of this chapter. 
2.1 Overview of File System. Kernel-
mode Routines 
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Windows drivers call the following routines 
during file operations: 
ZwCreateFile - to create ( or open) a 
file; 
ZwReadFile/ ZwWriteFile - to read and 
write the file content; 
ZwClose - to close the file handle and 
release system resources. 
The detailed overview of all the parameters 
for the functions are in MSDN (2017). All the 
steps for creating a file and getting the file 
handle are presented by Tanenbaum (2015). 
The first function ZwCreateFile takes the 
full file name, flags etc. and returns a handle to 
a successfully opened file or otherwise it returns 
error status. During this operation, the I/ O 
manager calls the Object Manager to look up 
the named file and to help it resolve any 
symbolic links to the file object (Easefilter, 
n.d.). 
Object Manager calls Security Reference 
Monitor (SRM) to process security checks, see 
Figure 1. 
According to Y osifovich, Ionescu, 
Russinovich, & Solomon (2017) SRM 
determines "whether a file's Access Control List 
(ACL) allows to access the file in the way its 
thread is requesting. If it does, the object 
manager grants the access and associates the 
granted access rights with the file handle that 
it returns". I/ O Manager builds 
FILE OBJECTS with the help from the 
Object Manager (Russinovich, 1997; Nagar, 
1997-a). The handle is used in read and write 
operations as well as to close the file. The 
FILE OBJECT structure is an internal OS 
structure, which plays the role of kernel 
equivalent of a handle. As a result, each opened 
file has two structures in memory: a handle and 
a FILE_ 0 EJECT, see Figure 1. 
The functions ZwReadFile\ ZwWriteFile 
take the handle obtained at the previous step 
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to read and write the files content. According 
to the Fernandez E. B. and Sinibaldi J.C. 
(2003) during these operations, SRM is not 
I 
( ) 
( ) 
involved, see Figure 1, and this vulnerability 
can be used by attackers. 
( ) 
I ( ) 
( ) 
cteate J ) 
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t 
I '1 
Figure 1. Internals of File System Routines in Windows Kernel 
Finally, the ZwClose routine takes a handle 
to finish all writing operations and close an 
opened file. During this operation, SRM is not 
involved either. 
2.2 W-mdows built-in sectnity 
sharing 
ZwCreateFile has a ShareAccess flag. This flag 
determines how the file is currently opened and 
also determines types of access allowed to 
proceed or deny with an error code of 
STATUS SHARING VIOLATION (Nagar, 
1997-a). 
Let us focus on the following scenario, see 
Figure 2. Driver A calls ZwCreateFile without 
sharing permission or with flag ShareAccess 
equals NULL. Object Manager successfully 
allocates FILE OBJECT. Next the attacker's 
Driver calls the ZwCreateFile in order to gain a 
legal access to the file, which is already opened 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
in an exclusive mode by DriverA. Object 
Manager returns the error status 
STATUS SHARING VIOLATION to the 
attacker's Driver and prevents access to the 
file. As a result , the attacker fails to open such 
a file. 
The present research reveals a vulnerability 
m File System Routines. The thing is that 
Object Manager addresses SRM only during 
ZwCreateFile call. Object Manager does not 
process any security checks during ZwReadFile 
and ZwWriteFile calls. 
2.3 Analysis of FILE_ OBJECT 
strncture 
Let us have a look at the details of 
FILE OBJECT structure. As it was mentioned 
before, this structure is created by I/ O 
Manager when a driver opens a file handle. 
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FILE OBJECT structure includes about The following four FILE_ OBJECT fields 
30 fields , the detailed overview of all these files 
are presented by (McHoes, & Flynn, 2013) and 
(Nagar, 1997-b). 
FILE OBJECT fields partially duplicates 
the flags , which have been used during calling 
ZwCreateFile. For example, for the file opened 
by ZwCreateFile routine with flag ShareAccess, 
which equals NULL, the corresponding 
FILE OBJECT structure has zero fields 
SharedRead and SharedWrite. The processed 
research shows that setting SharedRead and 
SharedWrite fields in the FILE OBJECT does 
not allow the shared access to this file. The 
information about files sharing permission is 
also collected by SRM in the ACLs. 
are used during read and write operations: 
Vpb; 
FsContext; 
FsContext2; 
SectionObjectPointer. 
The Vpb field is initialized by the I/ O 
Manager before sending a create or an open 
request to the file system driver. The Vpb field 
points to a mounted Volume Parameter Block 
(VPB), associated with the target device 
object. 
!t ) . 
(····························= 
--------·· 
.... -························t, ___ _________ _________________ /: 
Figure 2. Windows OS prevents an illegal access attempt via calling ZwCreateFile to the file opened without sharing 
permissions 
According to Nagar (1997-a) the FsContext , 
FsContext2 , and SectionObjectPointer fields 
are initialized and maintained by the file 
system drivers and the NT Cache Manager. 
FsContext points to the 
FSRTL COMMON FCB HEADER 
structure, which has to be allocated by the file 
system or network driver. 
FsContext2 field refers to the Context 
Control Block (CBB) associated with the file 
object. 
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SectionObjectPointer refers to a structure 
of type SECTION_ OBJECT_ POINTERS and 
stores file-mapping and caching-related 
information for a file stream. 
These four fields are used in read and write 
files operations , which are processed without 
involving SRM and checking shared permission. 
The key feature is that attackers can read 
these fields without any issues and use them to 
gain an access to the opened file. The details of 
this hijacked attack are below. 
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2.4 Accessing the content of the file 
opened in an exclusive mooe by 
hijacking its FILE_ OBJECT 
Let us move on to the considered scenario, 
see 
Figure 3. The attacker 's driver hijacks the target 
FILE_ 0 BJECT structure to gain an illegal access to the 
file opened without sharing permission 
. In a similar way, DriverA has opened a target 
file in an exclusive mode. Object Manager 
successfully allocated the FILE OBJECT 
structure to handle this file. 
As it was mentioned before, the legal access 
to this file is blocked and the malware driver 
processes the following steps to gain the access 
illegally: 
1. Calls ZwCreateFile routine to create a 
new file , e.g. with the name 
"hijacker.txt". 
2. Calls ObReferenceObjectByHandle to 
get a pointer to the created 
FILE_ OBJECT for the file hijacker.txt. 
3. Finds FILE OBJECT structure for the 
target file using the file name and walk 
through the Object Directory list 
(Probert, 2004; Pistelli, n.d.; Silberman, 
2006; Microsoft. n.d.; GamingMasteR, 
2009; Korkin & Nesterow, 2016; Fyyre, 
2018; Abdalhalim, 2018). 
4. Copies the following four fields from 
FILE_ OBJECT for the target_ file to 
the FILE OBJECT for the file 
hijacker. txt: 
Vpb; 
FsContext; 
FsContext2; 
SectionObjectPointer. 
5. Calls ZwReadFile/ ZwWriteFile with the 
opened handle for the hijack_ file to 
read and write the content of the 
target _ file. 
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After processing these five steps, malware 
driver has achieved a full read and write access 
to the target file. 
These manipulations were successfully 
tested on Windows 10, version 1809 x64. After 
waiting 10 hours, nothing happened, like 
appearing BSOD from PatchGuard, which is 
designed to prevent illegal memory 
modifications . 
The experimental results show that a 
malware driver can gain full access to the 
opened file without sharing permission by 
hijacking its FILE_ OBJECT and PatchGuard 
does not prevent this invasion. 
The presented kernel attack is applicable to 
all modern Windows OSes since Windows NT 
4.0. Windows components Object Manager and 
Security Reference Monitor involved in that 
attack, were first mentioned by Feldman 
( 1993). And the first memory protection 
concept was developed in Multics system GE 
mainframe in 1965 by Corbat6 & Vyssotsky 
(1965). 
To protect files content from being stolen 
and guarantee trusted computing the 
MemoryRanger hypervisor could be applied. 
The steps of adapting MemoryRanger to 
prevent this attack are in the next section. 
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Figure 3. The attacker's driver hijacks the target FILE_ OBJECT structure to gain an illegal access to the file opened 
without sharing permission 
3. JVlEMORYRANGER 
PREVENTS 
FILE OBJECT 
HLJACKING VIA 
JVlEMORY ISOLATION 
MemoryRanger is an open-source solution 
designed to protect kernel-mode memory by 
creating isolated kernel enclaves and running 
drivers inside them (Korkin, 2018-a). 
MemoryRanger has flexible architecture , which 
makes it possible to extend it for the 
protection of new memory regions without any 
issues. 
This chapter includes brief overview of 
main components of MemoryRanger and steps 
for adapting them to prevent FILE_ OBJECT 
hijacking attack. 
3.1 Mern.ocyR.anger architecture 
MemoryRanger is a hypervisor-based solution 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
and includes the following components, see 
Figure 4: 
A kernel-mode driver; 
DdiMon; 
MemoryMonRWX; 
Memory Access Policy (MAP) . 
The kernel-mode driver registers driver-
supplied callback routines that are 
subsequently notified about various OS events, 
for example, about loading a new driver. 
The next two components DdiMon and 
MemoryMonRWX leverage hypervisor facilities 
and use VT-x technology with Extended Page 
Tables (EPT) mechanism, provided by Intel 
CPU. 
DdiMon is designed to monitor device 
driver interfaces and is able to hook kernel-
mode API calls transparently for the OS. 
MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap 
all types of memory access: read, write, and 
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execute. 
Memory Access Policy (MAP) plays a role 
of an intermediary during memory access to 
the protected data and decides whether to 
block or allow access. 
Initially MemoryRanger allocates the 
default EPT structure and puts all loaded 
drivers and kernel inside it. MemoryRanger 
traps loading of a new driver, then 
MemoryRanger allocates and configures a new 
EPT structure so that only this new driver and 
OS kernel are executed here. MemoryRanger 
isolates execution of drivers by switching 
between EPTs. 
MemoryRanger hooks kernel API calls. The 
current version of MemoryRanger hooks 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag function to the 
protected newly allocated memory. Each time 
an isolated driver allocates memory, 
MemoryRanger updates all EPTs: the 
allocated memory buffer is accessible only for 
this driver, while all other EPTs exclude this 
memory. MemoryRanger skips the legal 
memory access attempts and prevents the 
illegal ones. 
Figure 4. MemoryRanger architecture 
3.2 Adapting MemocyR.anger to 
protect FILE_ OBJECT 
strnctures 
To add a FILE OBJECT support m 
MemoryRanger the modification of following 
components has been involved: 
DdiMon; 
MAP component. 
The updated DdiMon hooks two file 
system-related routines ZwCreateFile() and 
ZwClose(). 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
ZwCreateFile-callback routine processes the 
following: 
1. Calls the original ZwCreateFile routine 
and checks whether the returned status 
is successful. 
2. Checks whether the file has been 
created without sharing permission. 
3. Checks whether the return address 
belongs to the protected drivers. 
4. Gets the pointer to the allocated 
FILE O EJECT by calling 
0 bReferenceO bjectBy Handle. 
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5. Adds the FILE OBJECT pointer and 
its size, which equals 0xB bytes to the 
protected memory region. 
ZwClose()-callback routine processes the 
following: 
1. Checks whether the return address 
belongs to the protected drivers. 
2. Gets the pointer to the allocated 
FILE O EJECT by calling 
ObReferenceObjectByHandle. 
3. Deletes the FILE OBJECT pointer 
and its size, which equals 0xB-bytes 
from the list of the protected memory 
region. 
The MAP component algorithm processes 
access violation due to access to 
'h 
............................. .......................... 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
t .. a ...................... : i. ...................... a .. : 
:···· .............................................. \ 
. . 
l .. _a ·---------------- _ _.} _______________  
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
t. ______________ a.: 
'h 
FILE_ OBJECT structure in a similar way to 
the existing algorithm for processing access to 
the allocated memory pools. 
The experimental results demonstrate that 
updated MemoryRanger has successfully 
protected FILE O EJECT structures by 
preventing its hijacking without blocking legal 
access to FILE_ OBJECT, see Figure 5. The 
source code of updated MemoryRanger and 
video demonstrations are here (Korkin, 2018-
b). 
The processing experiments on Windows 10 
x64 have shown that developed updated 
MemoryRanger causes acceptable performance 
degradation. 
1-----------------1 1-----------------1 
t .......................... a .. : t-a-------------J 
,, ', 
. . 
: : 
. . 
l .. \ 
. . 
t. __ a ___________________ ._: -~--
. . 
. . 
. . 
t·-------------a·.: 
Figure 5. Memory Ranger prevents FILE_ OBJECT hijacking by 
running drives into isolated kernel-mode memory enclaves 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary: 
1. Recently published kernel-mode 
exploits highlight the fact that 
dynamically allocated data structures 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
in Windows OS kernel are becoming 
vulnerable. 
2. The analyzed attack on 
FILE OBJECT shows that the 
content of exclusively opened file can 
be tampered with. 
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3. The proposed update for 
The 
MemoryRanger shows how to prevent 
hijacking attacks on FILE OBJECT 
structures in kernel-mode memory. 
5. FUTURE PLANS 
5.1 Prevent ~ Privilege 
Escalation 
analysis of recent kernel-mode 
vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2018-8120 
(Rapid7, 2018-a), CVE-2018-8611 (Rapid7, 
2018-b) and CVE-2018-8170 (Rapid7, 2018-c) 
shows that typically, vulnerable drivers do not 
access EPROCESS structures, but after 
exploitation, they tamper with process 
structures. For example, during CVE-2018-
8120 exploitation Win32k.sys driver directly 
accesses EPROCESS fields, but usually this 
driver does not communicate with this 
structure. 
The current version of MemoryRanger 
traps the loading only of new drivers, moves 
only those to isolated enclosures. 
MemoryRanger skips already loaded drivers. 
MemoryRanger is able to prevent this 
attack by deliberately running all loaded 
drivers in separate enclaves. 
5.2 Protect ACL \DCL From Being 
Patched 
Information about objects access rights is 
collected in the Access Control List (ACL). 
During ZwCreateFile routine call, the 
ObjectManager asks about required permission 
from Security Reference Monitor, which walks 
through the ACL to check the permissions. 
ACL includes access control entries (ACEs), 
which indicate what rights are granted to the 
object (Hewardt & Pravat, 2008; Swift, 
Brundrett , Dyke, Garg, Hopkins, Chan, 
Goertzel, & Jensenworth, 2002; Bosworth & 
Kabay, 2002; Datta, 2012; The NT Insider, 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
2006; The NT Insider 1999; Govindavajhala & 
Appel, 2006; MSDN, 2018; Russinovich, 
Ionescu & Solomon, 2012). 
It seems promising to analyze the 
possibility of attacks on the ACL in order to 
deliberately change access mask and gain 
access to the target object. 
MemoryRanger could be applied to provide 
the integrity of ACL and prevent these attacks 
in general. 
Page 9
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